The Draft and… the Other Draft

Unlike sports like football and basketball, where draft picks contribute immediately, the MLB First Year Player Draft is an exercise in getting promising talent into your farm system in the hopes that in 3-5 years, an organization can mold that raw talent into major-league caliber talent. You may have heard the MLB Draft referred to as a “crap shoot.” This isn’t exactly fair to crap shoots, but you get the idea. First round, sure-bet prospects don’t always pan out. Diamonds in the rough from late rounds can turn into super stars. It seems that for every Alex Rodriguez, Joe Mauer, or David Price (all first round #1 overall picks), there is a Mike Piazza (62nd) round), Mark Buhrle (38th round),  or Buster Posey (50th round).

You know where I’m going with this: should the Orioles be trading in draft picks in 2014 to stock up for short-term success? Could the Orioles afford to go deeper into their pockets and sign additional free agents that cost them draft selections? If Scott were writing this post, it would be full of insightful analysis (and probably some intimidating charts), showing the value of a draft pick, the likelihood of that pick making it to the majors, or contributing to a certain level (out of spite, he’d probably use WAR). But that’s not me. I’m about as good with stats as a manatee on ice skates.

Instead, I want to talk about the approach. A team can get away with saying “damn the torpedoes” and give away the 2014 top end of the 2014 draft under certain conditions:

1. There is a real chance of the team competing in the short-term
2. Its minor league system is strong enough to withstand the hit
3. Its leadership can continue to bring in talent via other methods, to compensate.

The first condition is pretty clear: the Orioles have had two good seasons, after 14 years of absolute misery. The club has a talented young nucleus that, as it was constituted, could only get as far as “being in the discussion” come September. Meaningful games were very rewarding, for players and fans alike. But the team has a real chance of competing in the playoffs, if it gets the right pieces.

Then there’s the question of the farm system. Once the laughing stock of baseball (along with its major league counterpart), the Orioles’ minor league system has come a long way. Recent progress has led the industry to regard it as anywhere from top third (like Kieth Law) to top half in the majors. This has become an organization that can afford occasional missteps in terms of player development, where that was not the case even two years ago.

The last factor that I think really drives the organization’s flexibility on ruining their 2014 draft is that Dan Duquette works hard to stock the organization full of talent in many other ways. Other than being King of the Scrap Heap, Duquette also does his homework in the international community, bringing talent into the ballclub at all levels. Wei-Yin Chen, Miguel Gonzalez, and Henry Urrutia are examples of guys who have been brought in outside the draft and MLB free-agency pool, to augment the club. He’s not just at work at the major league level – this past year, the club beat its chest about signing two teenagers (one from Mexico, the other from the Dominican) who they view as potential big-leaguers.

The last, and to me most notable, method of restocking the organization is Dan Duquette’s use of the Rule 5 draft. You know the drill: steal a player from another organization who is not on their 40-man roster, and if you can keep the player on your 25-man for the whole season, you keep him. It’s a little more complicated than that, but basically it boils down to this: if you can deal with a player’s warts all season, you can keep him and continue to develop him to his full potential.The difference between the first year player draft and the Rule 5 draft is a team’s ability to forecast a player’s potential ceiling and floor. In the first year draft, it’s a crap shoot. You can’t tell the ceiling, and you’re not thinking about the floor. In the Rule 5 draft, you have a lot more information on a player, and if you can’t yet determine a player’s ceiling, you know the floor – you know what the player will be if he fails to continue to develop.

The Orioles have utilized the Rule 5 draft recently to bring Ryan Flaherty, TJ MacFarland, and Michael Alamanzar into the organization. It’s too early to tell if Alamanzar will stick, but the other two are good examples of the “known floor.” Flaherty was a guy with potential pop, who might someday be an every-day starter at the major-league level. At worst, he was going to continue to be as he was: a dependable fielder with high versatility, who wouln’t wow you with his bat.  Even at that floor, Flaherty was better than most infielders in the Orioles system – they guys who had been drafted and molded and hoped upon. Likewise, TJ MacFarland was a guy the Orioles selected who might yet turn into a decent starter at the major league level. Or a valuable LOOGY. But his floor is as it was then: a guy whose stuff will never be impressive, but a guy who can serve as a long man, make spot starts, and get lefties out at a good clip. At worst, he’s as valuable to the club as a Steve Johnson. MacFarland will be in AAA in 2014 – where he belongs. But the Orioles may be able to do something with him, and if not, will use those remaining options to use him when necessity calls.

The Rule 5 draft eases the Orioles’ dependence on the first year draft, and makes giving up on the top end of a draft class a little more palatable. Given that, why shouldn’t the Orioles say “damn the torpedoes?”